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IMPLEMENTING ENUMERATION

ANDREW COAN*
ABSTRACT
The enumeration of legislative powers in Article I of the U.S. Constitution implies that those powers must have limits. This familiar
“enumeration principle” has deep roots in American constitutional
history and has played a central role in recent federalism decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court. Courts and commentators, however, have
seldom rigorously considered what follows from embracing it. The
answer is by no means straightforward. The enumeration principle
tells us that federal power must be subject to some limit, but it does
not tell us what that limit should be. Nor does it tell us how the
Constitution’s commitment to limited federal power should be
balanced against its equally clear commitment to effective national
government. Finally, the enumeration principle sheds no light on the
difficult questions of judicial competence and capacity raised by a
principle that requires judges to craft limits on federal power out of
whole cloth. These difficulties may or may not be surmountable, but
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. I am grateful
to Anuj Desai, Kurt Lash, David Marcus, Toni Massaro, Richard Primus, Ted Schneyer, David
Schwartz, and Robert Yablon for helpful comments.
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no rigorous attempt to implement the enumeration principle can
avoid grappling with them.
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INTRODUCTION
The enumeration principle is familiar to all first-year constitutional law students. Conventionally understood, it holds that the
enumeration of legislative powers in Article I of the U.S. Constitution implies that those powers must be limited.1 Put in reverse, the
powers of Congress cannot amount to the equivalent of the general
legislative authority—or “police power”—enjoyed by the states.
Otherwise, why would the Framers have bothered drafting such a
careful and circumscribed list of legislative powers?
So formulated, the enumeration principle is a special case of the
expressio unius canon: to express one thing (enumeration) is to
exclude the other (a general federal police power).2 It can also be
understood as a special case of the closely related canon against
surplusage. To construe federal legislative power as the equivalent
of a general police power would render the careful enumeration of
powers in Article I purely gratuitous—in the language of the cases,
mere “surplusage.”3 Or so the argument goes.
There are good reasons that the enumeration principle is so familiar. It has deep roots in American constitutional history.4 More
recently, it has played a central role in justifying the only limits the
Supreme Court has enforced on the federal commerce power since
the New Deal—the economic/noneconomic distinction established
in United States v. Lopez5 and the activity/inactivity distinction
endorsed by five Justices in NFIB v. Sebelius.6 The enumeration
principle was also at the heart of the challengers’ arguments in
1. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Boundless Treaty Power Within a Bounded Constitution, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1499, 1510-11 (2015).
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 708 (5th ed. 2014) (explaining
the expressio unius canon and its limits).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 589 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(explaining the canon against surplusage and its limits).
4. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Sum of All Delegated Power: A Response to Richard
Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. F. 180, 191-95 (2014), http://www.yale
lawjournal.org/pdf/LashPDF_dkt69ak6.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT6F-YLJY] (canvassing historical sources).
5. See 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
6. See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012).
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Gonzales v. Raich, which convinced three Justices that the regulation of homegrown, state-sanctioned medical marijuana was beyond
the commerce power of Congress.7 If NFIB marks the arrival of a
new “constitutional gestalt,” as one leading commentator has suggested,8 the enumeration principle is unquestionably central to the
vision of American federalism that gestalt embraces.
The most interesting recent challenge to this vision comes from
Richard Primus.9 The enumeration of specific federal powers in the
U.S. Constitution may “presuppose[ ] something not enumerated,”
he argues, but it requires only that Congress be limited to those
powers enumerated in Article I.10 Depending on the state of the
external world, it is entirely possible that the sum of those powers
will be indistinguishable from a general police power.11 In particular, given the highly integrated character of the modern American
economy, the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses may, in
2016, be best read to encompass virtually all human activity.12 If
that is the case, Primus contends, nothing in the text, history, or
structure of the Constitution justifies the imposition of artificial
“internal limits” on Congress’s powers.13
Primus may be right, but he is a clear outlier. The Supreme
Court’s post-1995 federalism decisions have many academic critics,
but few take serious issue with the enumeration principle. None of
the dissenting Justices in those cases has disputed its validity. Like
7. See 545 U.S. 1, 42-43, 47, 52 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 57-58 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
8. Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91
WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (2013).
9. See generally Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576 (2014)
[hereinafter Primus, Limits]; Richard Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, 114 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter Primus, Enumeration Matters].
10. Primus, Limits, supra note 9, at 637 (emphasis added).
11. See id. at 580.
12. See id. at 620.
13. Id. at 580. But see Lash, supra note 4, at 180 (“If we are talking about enumeration
in general, then Primus is right .... If we are talking about our actual Constitution, however,
he is wrong.”). “Internal limits” flow from the outer boundaries of Congress’s enumerated
powers, “external limits” from specific prohibitions on the exercise of those powers that apply
even within their boundaries. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 297
(2d ed. 1988). The individual rights protections of the Bill of Rights are the classic example
of external limits but not the only one. See id. Among others, the anticommandeering principle established in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992), and the prohibitions
of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 also fall into this category.
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the correctness of Brown v. Board of Education,14 acceptance of the
enumeration principle remains something close to a prerequisite for
admission to the American constitutional mainstream. All of the
sitting Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court appear to embrace it.15
Even Primus recognizes the conventional understanding of the enumeration principle as a “longstanding orthodoxy” with a venerable
pedigree in American constitutional thought.16
Taking this orthodoxy as given, this Article asks what follows
from accepting it. How, precisely, does the enumeration principle
bear on the resolution of particular constitutional challenges to
particular exercises of congressional power? How, in other words,
should the Supreme Court go about implementing that principle?
Surprisingly, courts and commentators have seldom rigorously
considered this important question. The answer is by no means
straightforward.
There are three essential difficulties. First, if the enumeration
principle tells us that Congress’s power must be subject to some
internal limit, it does not tell us what that limit should be. Put
differently, the set of internal limits consistent with the enumeration principle is infinite—or nearly so. Some additional justification
is therefore needed to defend any particular limit.
Second, the enumeration principle does not tell us how to balance
the Constitution’s commitment to internal limits with its equally
apparent commitment to effective national government. Put differently, the enumeration principle focuses exclusively on the risk of
Type I errors (giving Congress too much power) while ignoring the
risk of Type II errors (giving Congress too little power). This
problem is made especially acute by the fact that the enumeration
principle does no serious analytic work unless the sum of Congress’s
enumerated powers is otherwise—that is, without reference to the
enumeration principle—best interpreted as equivalent to a general
police power.

14. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. [NFIB] v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577-78 (2012); id.
at 2628 & n.11 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2646 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
16. Primus, Limits, supra note 9, at 580. See generally Lash, supra note 4 (defending the
historical and doctrinal pedigree of the enumeration principle).
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Third, the enumeration principle sheds no light on the questions
of judicial competence and capacity raised by a principle that requires judges to craft internal limits from whole cloth, when the best
reading of the constitutional text would otherwise render federal
power free from such constraints. What do Supreme Court Justices
know about the optimal balance of state and federal power in the
twenty-first century? The categorical tests they have embraced thus
far—distinguishing between economic and noneconomic activity and
between activity and inactivity—are not encouraging. Neither of
these distinctions is even a fair proxy for “what is truly national and
what is truly local.”17
It is no accident, however, that the Supreme Court has embraced
such crude categorical rules. A more sensitive standard, which
might permit the Court to more reliably distinguish the national
from the local, would generate substantial uncertainty, casting a
pall of constitutional doubt over a broad swath of federal legislation.
Because the Supreme Court reviews nearly every lower court decision invalidating a federal law, such an approach might well invite
more litigation than the Court could handle.18
Any attempt to implement the enumeration principle therefore
threatens to impale the Court on the horns of a dilemma. It can
either settle for a crude categorical rule, which poorly serves the
underlying purposes of American federalism, or embrace a more
sensitive standard and risk overwhelming its own limited capacity,
which it has historically been unwilling to do.19 Compared to these
alternatives, abandoning the enumeration principle does not look so
bad. This, at any rate, is the challenge that proponents of that
principle must overcome.
I do not propose to resolve these difficulties in this brief Article.
However, I do propose that they are worth grappling with. Indeed,
for anyone who embraces the enumeration principle as conventionally understood, they are unavoidable. More generally, these
difficulties highlight a surprisingly little-remarked challenge of
interpreting a 225-year-old constitution. Not only can the passage
17. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
18. See Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122
YALE L.J. 422, 428-29 (2012); infra Part IV.B.
19. See infra Part IV.
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of time change the practical meaning of such a constitution20—or
render it clumsy and outdated, as critics have long urged.21 The passage of time can also place such a constitution—and perhaps does
place the U.S. Constitution—at war with itself. This possibility
deserves more attention than it has received to date.
I. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ENUMERATION
What follows from the enumeration principle conventionally understood? At least since 1995, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
has thought the answer to be straightforward.22 Any interpretation
of Congress’s enumerated powers that would render them without
internal limit—that is, the effective equivalent of a general police
power—must be rejected. Conversely, the proper interpretation of
Congress’s enumerated powers—individually and in the aggregate—must impose some internal limit on those powers.
This was the essential logic behind the economic/noneconomic
distinction announced in Lopez and reaffirmed in United States v.
Morrison. In defending the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act, respectively, the government relied on
the “substantial effects test,” which, at the time, permitted Congress
to regulate any activity it rationally believed, in the aggregate, to
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.23 As a matter of
existing doctrine, this argument was strong.24 But as Chief Justice
20. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1993)
(“[W]e all know that sometimes fidelity to an original meaning requires doing something
different, and that, in those cases, doing the same thing done before would be to change the
meaning of what was done before.”); Primus, Limits, supra note 9, at 580 (“[W]hether the
powers of Congress have as great a scope in practice as a general police power .... can only be
answered by examining the powers and applying them sensibly to the social world” at any
given time).
21. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 15-16 (2006); Michael J.
Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 383-87 (1997); see also LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN,
ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 11-12 (2013) (ebook).
22. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-66.
23. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612-13 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559,
563-64.
24. In nearly sixty years of applying the substantial effects test, the Court had not once
held federal legislation unconstitutional. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 625-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Rehnquist explained for the Lopez majority, “[I]f we were to accept
the Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.”25 Unwilling to step onto this slippery slope, the Court effectively prohibited Congress from regulating noneconomic activities.
The enumeration principle was also the driving force behind
Justice O’Connor’s and, especially, Justice Thomas’s dissents in
Gonzales v. Raich, which would have held Congress powerless to
regulate homegrown medical marijuana—at least in states that
sanctioned and regulated its use.26 Again the government relied on
the substantial effects test to defend the Controlled Substances
Act.27 This time the Court agreed, holding that the cultivation and
consumption of marijuana—even on a small, noncommercial scale—
were economic activities, which Congress rationally could have believed to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.28
The dissenters were not convinced. Justice O’Connor protested
that the majority’s broad definition of economic activity drew “no
line at all.”29 Justice Thomas echoed Lopez: “If Congress can regulate this under the Commerce Clause, then it can regulate virtually
anything—and the Federal Government is no longer one of limited
and enumerated powers.”30 Unwilling to accept this result, both
Justices would have required Congress to demonstrate that regulation of personal cultivation and consumption was genuinely—not
merely rationally—necessary to the regulation of the interstate
marijuana market.31
Finally, and most recently, the enumeration principle was central
to the strategy of the Affordable Care Act challengers in NFIB v.
Sebelius: If Congress could force otherwise inactive citizens to buy
health insurance on the private market, they asked, what could it
not do? Convinced that the answer was “nothing,” five Justices embraced a constitutional prohibition—an internal limit—on congres25. Id. at 564 (majority opinion).
26. See 545 U.S. 1, 42-43 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 57-58 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
27. See id. at 12 n.20 (majority opinion).
28. See id. at 22, 25-26.
29. Id. at 50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 57-58 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
31. See id. at 51-52 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 60-61, 64 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

1994

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1985

sional regulation of inactivity under the Commerce and Necessary
and Proper Clauses.32 As the joint dissent put it, to say that the
failure to purchase health insurance “nonetheless affects commerce
and therefore can be federally regulated, is to make mere breathing
in and out the basis for federal prescription and to extend federal
power to virtually all human activity.”33 On this basis, Chief Justice
Roberts and the four joint dissenters dismissed the government’s
very strong argument that an individual insurance purchase mandate was essential to the functioning of the Affordable Care Act’s
other regulations of the national health insurance market.34
II. AN EMBARRASSMENT OF LIMITS
There is a missing link in this logical chain. From the requirement that federal power as a whole be subject to some internal limit,
Lopez, Morrison, and NFIB infer that the commerce power must be
subject to quite particular limits—namely, a virtually absolute prohibition on the regulation of noneconomic activities and a categorical bar on the regulation of inactivity. But these are hardly the
only limits that would satisfy the enumeration principle. Indeed, the
universe of potential limits is practically infinite.
Consider the following list. To implement the enumeration principle, Congress might be prohibited from exercising its commerce
power to regulate:
(1) activities (or inactivities) whose most important effects are
intrastate;35
(2) activities (or inactivities) occurring in (or affecting) only a
small fraction of states;
(3) activities (or inactivities) engaged in by (or affecting) only a
small fraction of the national population;
(4) activities (or inactivities) traditionally regulated exclusively
by the States;
(5) activities (or inactivities) beginning with the letter “G”;
32. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591-93 (2012); id. at 2646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 2643 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See id. at 2625-26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 162-63 (2010).
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(6) persons who share a first name with any core Sesame Street
character;36 or
(7) the noncommercial cultivation, possession, and consumption
of marijuana for medical purposes by women over the age of
forty within a sixty-mile radius of San Francisco, California.37

The list could go on, but the point should be clear. The universe of
potential limits on federal power is constrained only by the imagination. Because the enumeration principle merely requires that federal power be subject to some limit, that principle can provide no help
in choosing among the large universe of candidates.38
This is not to say that all limits are equally plausible. We can
probably dispense with numbers five and six above without much
discussion. Neither the letter “G” nor the names of Sesame Street
characters have any plausible basis in the constitutional text, the
underlying purposes of American federalism, or Supreme Court case
law. Presumably, number seven, standing alone, would not constitute the sort of “meaningful” limit proponents of the enumeration
principle frequently insist upon.39 But this just underscores the need
for additional criteria beyond the enumeration principle to support
the choice of limits on federal power.

36. At a minimum, this would preclude federal regulation of persons named Bert, Ernie,
Big Bird, or Oscar. The boundaries of the Sesame Street core, however, are a bit fuzzy. Cf.
Richard Primus & Eve Brensike Primus, The Core of Sesame Street: An Empirical Assessment 1 (Dec. 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
37. Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26-28 (2005) (rejecting as-applied challenge to
federal regulation of noncommercial cultivation, possession, and consumption of marijuana,
as prescribed by a doctor pursuant to state law).
38. If the commerce power alone threatens the enumeration principle, any viable limit
would have to impose outer bounds on that power. At least in theory, however, the threat to
limited federal power might arise from the commerce power in combination with Congress’s
other legislative powers. That is to say, even if the best reading of the commerce power is
subject to internal limits, the other powers of Congress might permit it to regulate whatever
lies outside the commerce power. In this case, the enumeration principle could be satisfied
either by imposing additional internal limits on the commerce power or by imposing such
limits on some other enumerated power—say, the copyright or the taxation power. Because
most contemporary applications of the enumeration principle focus on the threat posed by the
commerce power (and the Necessary and Proper Clause) standing alone, I bracket this possibility for the remainder of my analysis.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(describing the Court’s “duty to recognize meaningful limits on the commerce power of
Congress”) (emphasis added).
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A. Text
One obvious possibility is the constitutional text. The Commerce
Clause authorizes Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the
several States.”40 At first blush, economic activity seems to be a fair,
if somewhat broad, synonym for commerce. Conversely, it seems uncontroversial that noneconomic activity—like possession of firearms
in school zones and gender-motivated crimes of violence—is not
commerce.41 Morrison encourages this reading, frequently using the
terms “noncommercial” and “noneconomic” interchangeably.42 Similarly, it seems plausible to say that “commerce” is a form of activity,
and that whatever its precise bounds, it does not encompass
economic inactivity. In NFIB, Chief Justice Roberts made this point
explicitly.43
The problem with this textual answer is that Congress’s regulatory power over guns, violent crime, and health insurance is not
defined by the commerce power alone.44 It also includes the Necessary and Proper Clause, and nothing in the text of the latter limits
Congress’s power either to “commerce” or “activity.”45 Justice Scalia
made this point nicely in his Raich concurrence.46 It may be true, as
Chief Justice Roberts argued in NFIB, that the Necessary and
Proper Clause implicitly incorporates the enumeration principle and
therefore requires that Congress’s power be subject to internal limits.47 But this just brings us back to where we started: How did the
Court arrive at these particular limits? They certainly do not derive
from the text of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
B. Purpose
What about the underlying purposes of American federalism?
Lopez, Morrison, and NFIB cited two such purposes as justifications
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
41. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
42. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11.
43. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (“The power to regulate commerce
presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated.”) (emphasis omitted).
44. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
45. See id. cl. 18.
46. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34-35 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
47. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2579.
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for limiting federal power: (1) distinguishing “between what is truly
national and what is truly local”48 and (2) “protect[ing] the liberty of
the individual from arbitrary power.”49 Certainly, these are not the
only purposes one might attribute to the American federal system.
But even with respect to these explicitly stated justifications, the
economic/noneconomic and activity/inactivity distinctions fare remarkably poorly.
As Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel have persuasively shown, not all
economic activities require national regulation, and plenty of noneconomic activities do require such regulation.50 The same is true of
the activity/inactivity distinction, as Justice Ginsburg persuasively
argued in her NFIB dissent.51 If individual states were to mandate
the purchase of insurance as part of a scheme like the Affordable
Care Act, they would face a real risk that their healthiest residents
would flee to other states, while the sickest residents of other states
would flock to their borders. This interstate collective action
problem makes national regulation of the nonpurchase of health
insurance far more pressing than national regulation of many
economic activities. In the parlance of Lopez and Morrison, neither
noneconomic activity nor economic inactivity is “truly local,” nor is
economic activity “truly national.” The world is messier than that.
Alas, the economic/noneconomic and activity/inactivity distinctions are no more promising as safeguards of individual liberty. As
Raich illustrates, federal regulation of economic activity can and
does strike at such fundamental and intimate personal choices as
the selection of doctor-prescribed treatments for debilitating disease.52 By contrast, the only liberty infringed by the Violence
Against Women Act’s regulation of noneconomic, gender-motivated
crimes of violence is that of the rapist or assailant.53 If anything, the

48. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
49. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011)).
50. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 35, at 172-73, 184 (identifying pollution as noneconomic activity requiring national regulation).
51. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2618-20 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
52. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5-7, 15, 25-26 (2005).
53. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605-06.
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Act seems to enhance liberty—at least of the sort entitled to moral
respect—by extending additional protection to crime victims.54
What about federal regulation of economic inactivity? Chief Justice Roberts’s solo opinion in NFIB raises the specter of a federal
broccoli purchase mandate,55 which certainly sounds unpleasant.
But is such a mandate any worse, from the standpoint of individual
liberty, than a prohibition on the cultivation or consumption of broccoli, which the activity/inactivity distinction would plainly allow?56
It is not easy to see why. In fact, a prohibition on the consumption
of broccoli would completely preclude any individual from choosing
to eat this delicious vegetable. A broccoli purchase mandate, by
contrast, would permit those unable to appreciate its nutritious
goodness to throw away or donate their purchases.
Notably, none of the Justices who joined the Lopez, Morrison, and
NFIB majorities made any meaningful attempt to explain why the
federal government is systematically better situated to regulate
economic activity, or, conversely, why the states are systematically
better situated to regulate noneconomic activity or economic
inactivity. Nor has any Justice attempted to explain why federal
regulations of noneconomic activity and economic inactivity pose a
systematically greater threat to individual liberty than do regulations of economic activity. On reflection, this is not terribly surprising. Persuasive explanations along these lines are extremely
difficult to imagine.
C. Doctrine
What about judicial precedent? Prior to Lopez and Morrison, the
Supreme Court had never prohibited Congress from regulating noneconomic activity under the substantial effects test,57 but neither
had it clearly authorized such regulation.58 The same goes for
54. See id.
55. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (Roberts, C.J.).
56. Cf. Raich, 545 U.S. at 9 (upholding a federal prohibition on the cultivation and consumption of another green plant).
57. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (emphasizing the irrelevance of “nomenclature such as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’” in comparison to “the actual effects of the
activity in question upon interstate commerce”).
58. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (“[T]he pattern is clear. Where
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activ-
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federal regulation of economic inactivity prior to NFIB.59 Both of
these limits, therefore, were at least arguably consistent with the
Court’s previous commerce power decisions. The same, however, is
true of nearly every alternative limit listed at the beginning of this
Part, including the prohibitions on regulating activities beginning
with the letter “G” and persons with the names of Sesame Street
characters.60 Thus, judicial precedent cannot explain the Court’s embrace of the economic/noneconomic and activity/inactivity distinctions in preference to these limits—or to the practically infinite
universe of other limits that were, likewise, arguably consistent
with the Court’s previous commerce power decisions.
D. Summing Up
This analysis leaves a final possibility. The internal limits embraced by the Court were pulled out of thin air. They lack any
plausible constitutional rationale except the need for some limit.61
Under a conventional understanding of the enumeration principle,
this does make the economic/noneconomic and activity/inactivity
distinctions preferable to truly unlimited interpretations of the federal commerce power. But it cannot explain why these limits are
preferable to the innumerable other limits that are equally consistent with constitutional text, purpose, and precedent, as well as the
enumeration principle. This is not necessarily an insurmountable
obstacle to judicial implementation of the enumeration principle. It
is, however, a real difficulty, which that principle’s judicial and academic defenders have as yet failed to confront.

ity will be sustained.”) (emphasis added).
59. Compare NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing congressional
power to regulate economic inactivity as a “question[ ] of first impression”), with id. at 2587
(Roberts, C.J.) (noting that the Court’s commerce power decisions “uniformly describe the
power as reaching ‘activity’”).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
61. See Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1295, 1323 (1997)
(“The actual limiting principle, then, on which Chief Justice Rehnquist can be said to rely in
Lopez, is the weirdly circular proposition that there must be a limiting principle.”). I thank
Richard Primus for this reference.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL TRADE-OFFS
By failing to acknowledge the necessity of choosing among limits,
the Supreme Court and its academic defenders have overlooked a
second and closely related difficulty. The enumeration principle does
not tell us how to balance the Constitution’s commitment to internal
limits with its equally apparent commitment to effective national
government. Any rigorous attempt to implement the enumeration
principle must grapple with this difficulty, not blink it away.
By “effective national government” I simply mean the Constitution’s commitment to creating a national government that can exercise its enumerated powers—those the founding generation judged
to require national action—fully and effectively. This commitment
cannot be dismissed as incidental or obviously subordinate. It was
the principal motivation for convening the Philadelphia Convention
of 1787 and a principal theme of the arguments made on behalf of
ratification.62 It features prominently in Supreme Court decisions
running from McCulloch v. Maryland63 and Gibbons v. Ogden64
through United States v. Darby65 and Wickard v. Filburn66 through

62. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, at 158-59 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman
ed., 2008) (ebook) (“Nothing ... can be more fallacious than to infer the extent of any power
proper to be lodged in the national government from ... its immediate necessities. There ought
to be a CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies as they may happen; and as these are
illimitable in their nature, so it is impossible safely to limit that capacity.”).
63. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (“The subject is the execution of those great
powers on which the welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must have been the intention
of those who gave these powers, to insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution.”).
64. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (“The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and
to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not
necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
government.”).
65. See 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (“The power of Congress over interstate commerce ‘is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations
other than are prescribed in the Constitution.’” (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196)).
66. See 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (emphasizing “the embracing and penetrating nature”
of the commerce power); id. (approving of Gibbons’s “warning that effective restraints on its
exercise must proceed from political rather than from judicial processes” (citing Gibbons, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197)).

2016]

IMPLEMENTING ENUMERATION

2001

Raich.67 It is also arguably the most persuasive structural explanation for the list of enumerated powers vested in Congress by Article
I.68
To be sure, nearly all of these sources have assumed, implicitly or
explicitly, that a commitment to effective national government and
the enumeration principle could be fully reconciled.69 Put differently, they have assumed that full and effective exercise of Congress’s
enumerated powers would naturally amount to something less than
a general police power.70 But if that were so, we would not need the
enumeration principle to decide constitutional cases. The internal
limits it requires would simply inhere in the best interpretation of
Congress’s enumerated powers. Only when the best interpretation
of Congress’s powers would otherwise result in the effective equivalent of a general police power does the enumeration principle do
any serious analytic work.71 This does not mean that the enumeration principle must necessarily give way to the constitutional
imperative of effective national government. It does mean that, in
every case in which the enumeration principle really matters, these
two constitutional commitments will be in real conflict.
67. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” (quoting Wickard,
317 U.S. at 125)); id. at 22 (“We need not determine whether respondents’ activities, taken
in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a rational
basis exists for so concluding.”).
68. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 35, at 121-24; see also Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (2010).
69. See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124 (“The power of Congress over interstate commerce
is plenary and complete in itself ... and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed
in the Constitution.... Hence the reach of that power extends to those intrastate activities
which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power.”
(quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942))).
70. See id. at 124-25 (refraining from granting Congress a general police power over all
the states by establishing a requirement that an activity “exert[ ] a substantial economic effect
on interstate commerce” to be subject to regulation under the commerce power).
71. For present purposes, I take no position on the proper approach to constitutional interpretation. Whatever that approach might be, the enumeration principle does no significant
analytic work unless, under that approach, federal power is otherwise best interpreted as the
equivalent of a general police power. Cf. Primus, Limits, supra note 9, at 635 (“The canon is
a rule for construing the powers of Congress (‘Under no circumstances may you read these
powers such that they end up covering all possible subjects of legislation’), not a description
of something that one would discover after construing the powers without the influence of that
rule (‘Hey, I read all these grants of power and thought about what they add up to collectively,
and it turns out that they don’t exhaust all possible subjects of legislation’).”).
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Kurt Lash denies this. In his view, the best interpretation of Congress’s powers will always be limited.72 The role of the enumeration
principle is not to support or impose additional limits. It is simply
to guard against abusive misconstructions that would improperly
transform those powers into a general police power.73 The problem
with this view is that the enumeration principle does almost no
analytic work. At most, it serves as a kind of reliability check for results reached, and independently justified, on other grounds. If the
enumeration principle played only this modest role, it would be
difficult to understand the passion of either its defenders or its
critics.
As actually applied by the Supreme Court, however, the enumeration principle performs a far more robust function. It serves as the
sole proffered justification for rejecting otherwise plausible interpretations of congressional power.74 It also serves as the sole proffered
justification for judicial enforcement of particular internal limits.75
To perform either of these functions, the enumeration principle
must be in conflict with the otherwise best interpretation of Congress’s enumerated powers—and, thus, with the Constitution’s commitment to effective national government.
How do Lopez, Morrison, and NFIB grapple with this conflict?
Basically, by ignoring it. In each case, the Court considered only
whether the Government’s interpretation of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses would grant Congress the equivalent of
a general police power.76 In Lopez and Morrison, this meant asking
whether there was any limit on the activities that Congress could
rationally believe to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce when considered in the aggregate.77 In NFIB, it meant asking
whether the power to regulate economic inactivity rendered all

72. See Lash, supra note 4, at 180-81.
73. See id. at 181-83.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (rejecting the otherwise
plausible argument that Congress could “regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct
based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce”).
75. See, e.g., id. at 616 & n.7 (holding that “the limitation of congressional authority is not
solely a matter of legislative grace” but that it is subject to judicial review as well).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (declining to grant Congress a general police power over the states through the Commerce Clause).
77. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-13; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.

2016]

IMPLEMENTING ENUMERATION

2003

other limits on federal power effectively meaningless.78 Answering
each of these questions in the affirmative, the Court jumped directly
to the conclusion that its preferred tests—the economic/noneconomic
and activity/inactivity distinctions—were superior.79
This should have been only one side of the analysis. Having concluded that the government’s proposed test would give Congress too
much power, the Court should have asked whether its own proposed
test would give Congress too little. More concretely, the Court
should have asked whether its proposed test would deny Congress
the power to address serious national problems that the federal
government is better situated to regulate than the states acting on
their own.
In all three cases, the clear answer was yes. In Lopez and Morrison, the Court denied Congress the power to deal with noneconomic
activities—such as a refusal to be vaccinated or submit to quarantine for pandemic disease—that states cannot plausibly regulate on
their own.80 Similarly, in NFIB, the Court denied Congress the
power—at least under the Commerce Clause—to deal with an
economic inactivity—the nonpurchase of health insurance—that
states cannot plausibly regulate on their own.81 Again, this does not
mean the Court was necessarily wrong, but its analysis was
indefensibly one-sided.
A more balanced approach would have considered both Type I and
Type II errors—that is, false positives and false negatives. In this
context, Type I errors are cases in which a proposed constitutional
test would give Congress more power than it needs. More precisely,
they are cases in which the states, on balance, are better situated
than Congress to deal with a problem. Type II errors, by contrast,
are cases in which a proposed constitutional test would give
78. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586-88 (2012); id. at 2649 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
79. See id. at 2586-88 (majority opinion); id. at 2649 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514
U.S. at 564. In NFIB v. Sebelius, there was technically no opinion for the Court. But five Justices agreed that the power to regulate economic inactivity would render federal authority
limitless and that this justified limiting the commerce power to economic activity.
80. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (declining to grant Congress the authority to regulate
noneconomic, gender-based discriminatory actions based solely on their aggregate effect on
interstate commerce); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (declining to grant Congress the authority to
regulate the noneconomic possession of firearms based solely on their aggregate effect on
interstate commerce).
81. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585, 2587, 2591, 2593.
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Congress less power than it needs. More precisely, they are cases in
which Congress is, on balance, better situated than the states to
deal with a problem. Ideally, the Court would consider and attempt
to minimize the sum total of both types of errors.
This is no easy task. Figuring out which problems Congress is
best situated to regulate and which are best left to the states is a
very complex inquiry, made all the more complicated by the need to
translate the results into judicially administrable rules. In theory,
this inquiry might result in a constitutional test that ignores one
type of error in some or all circumstances. Although superficially
obtuse, such a one-sided test could conceivably produce the lowest
sum total of error costs in the aggregate, given the Court’s limited
competence and capacity.82 More concretely, a one-sided test might
correct for a systematic bias in the Court’s diagnosis of Type I and
Type II errors—for example, one in favor of expanding federal power. This sort of “second-best” analysis is probably the best defense
of Lopez, Morrison, and NFIB, though a lot of unpacking would be
required to make it persuasive.83 It is also the best defense of the
dissenters in those cases, who would basically surrender the field to
Congress—in effect ignoring Type I errors.84
The Court may or may not be up to the job of cashing all this out.
Indeed, the difficulty of these questions is a traditional justification
for the Court to defer to congressional judgments.85 But if the Court
is to implement the enumeration principle at all, it cannot responsi-

82. See infra Part IV. If we factor in decision costs, as well as error costs, the chances of
a one-sided rule winning out over a more balanced (and thus more complicated and costly)
alternative would be even higher.
83. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and
the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17-23 (2009).
84. See Coan, supra note 18, at 443-46 (elaborating such a defense); cf. Primus, Limits,
supra note 9, at 582 (“[T]he federal structure of American government has long been maintained not by internal limits on Congress’s powers but by a combination of external limits,
process limits, and the practical conditions that shape interactions between federal and state
officials. There is .... no reason to think that a better brand of federalism would result if some
consequential set of internal limits were added to the mix.”) (footnote omitted).
85. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1503
(1994) (“[J]udges lack the resources, know-how, and flexibility to make dependable decisions
about the level at which to govern in today’s complex and rapidly evolving world. Hence the
non-role of the courts in federalism.”).
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bly ignore the Constitution’s competing commitment to effective
national government.86
IV. JUDICIAL COMPETENCE AND CAPACITY
As we have seen, the enumeration principle demands a great deal
of those who would invoke it to impose internal limits on federal
power.87 From these demands flows yet another difficulty: the enumeration principle tells us nothing about the Supreme Court’s
competence to choose among the universe of potential internal
limits or to balance the risk of Type I and Type II errors. Nor does
it tell us anything about the Court’s ability to undertake these tasks
without overwhelming its limited capacity. Because the Court’s
limited capacity constrains the options at its disposal for implementing the enumeration principle, these questions are interdependent.
A. Judicial Competence
What do Supreme Court Justices know about the optimal balance
of state and federal power in the twenty-first century? About the
empirical incidence of collective action problems and interstate spillovers that preclude states from acting effectively on their own?88
About the accountability costs associated with federal law making?89
About the complex conflict-coordination game of the modern regulatory-cum-welfare state, with its deeply intertwined federal and state
bureaucracies?90 About the complex interactions between federalism
86. Cf. id. at 1502 (“There are, after all, two sides to federalism: not just preserving state
authority where appropriate, but also enabling the federal government to act where national
action is desirable.”).
87. See supra Part III.
88. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 35, at 131-33.
89. See, e.g., V.F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 835,
874 (2004) (“As a general rule, it is easier for a majority to be constructed in a town than a
city, a state than in a nation (even if there may be exceptions to that rule).”); Gordon Tullock,
Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 PUB. CHOICE 19, 21 (1969) (“[T]he smaller the governmental
unit the more influence any one of its citizens may expect to exert, consequently, the smaller
the unit, the closer it will come to fitting the preference patterns of its citizens.”).
90. See generally David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008);
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256
(2009).
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and America’s increasingly cohesive and polarized party system?91
The answer is not nothing, to be sure. But whether the Justices
know enough—or have good enough fact-finding and remedial tools
at their disposal—to do more good than harm in implementing the
enumeration principle is a serious question.92
Lopez, Morrison, and NFIB have obscured this question by
ignoring the difficulties discussed in Parts II and III. They did not
compare the economic/noneconomic or activity/inactivity distinction
to other plausible limits. Nor did they balance the risk of Type II
errors associated with these limits against the risk of Type I errors
associated with the government’s position. Instead, they gave the
impression that these limits sprang directly and straightforwardly
from the enumeration principle itself.93 If this were true, implementing the enumeration principle would be fairly standard lawyerly
work.
Of course, it is not true. As Parts I and II have shown, the
enumeration principle tells us that Congress’s power must be
subject to some internal limit, but it does not tell us what that limit
should be. Nor does it tell us how to balance the Constitution’s commitment to internal limits with its equally apparent commitment to
effective national government. These questions cannot be answered
without making complex judgments about the optimal division of
power between the federal government and the states—judgments
that must rest on criteria other than the enumeration principle,
constitutional text, or judicial precedent. Rather than providing a
route around this thicket, as Lopez, Morrison, and NFIB imply, the
enumeration principle leads straight into it.
I do not suggest that this is a decisive objection to judicial
implementation of the enumeration principle. Someone, or some
institution, must make these difficult judgments.94 The practical
alternative to judicial implementation of the enumeration principle
91. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077
(2014).
92. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 89, at 894-95 (raising this question and expressing
doubts).
93. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 615 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
94. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (1994) (emphasizing the intrinsically comparative
nature of institutional choice).
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is to leave these questions to Congress, which has significant informational advantages over the Court, but at least in some contexts,
may face problematic incentives to expand its power into spheres
that would be better regulated by the states.95 Perhaps judicial implementation of the enumeration principle makes things better on
balance, perhaps not. The important point is that proponents of that
principle cannot avoid this difficult question.
B. Judicial Capacity
The crude categorical character of the limits established in Lopez,
Morrison, and NFIB is not especially encouraging. As Part II
showed, these limits appear to have almost no connection to the underlying purposes of American federalism. They give Congress more
power than it needs over economic activities and less than it needs
over noneconomic activities and economic inactivity.96 They also
permit very serious interference with personal liberty while prohibiting much more moderate interference.
Yet it is no accident that the Supreme Court has embraced such
crude categorical rules. A more sensitive standard, requiring that
federal commerce power statutes respond to a sufficiently serious
national problem, might permit the Court to distinguish the national from the local more reliably. But such a standard, if applied with
any stringency, would cast a pall of constitutional doubt over an
enormous quantity of federal legislation.97 Indeed, what commerce
95. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1, 74 (2004) (“[C]ompetition [between federal and state politicians] provides strong incentives
for federal representatives to expand their own responsibilities at the expense of their statelevel colleagues.”).
96. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 35, at 131.
97. The best recent example of such an approach is Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Raich,
which genuinely grappled with the question of whether federal regulation of homegrown
medical marijuana was necessary to solve an interstate problem. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545
U.S. 1, 47-48 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). For any given subset of regulated activity, she
would have had the Court independently inquire into the necessity for federal regulation. See
id. In rejecting this approach, the majority emphasized its concern about inviting litigants to
propose ad hoc exemptions from federal regulatory schemes. See id. at 28 (majority opinion)
(“[T]he dissenters’ rationale logically extends to place any federal regulation (including
quality, prescription, or quantity controls) of any locally cultivated and possessed controlled
substance for any purpose beyond the ‘“outer limits”’ of Congress’ Commerce Clause
authority.”).
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power legislation would not be vulnerable to challenge under this
formulation? Such a result would not only generate costly legal uncertainty. It would also bury the federal courts under an avalanche
of new litigation, much of which the Supreme Court would feel
compelled to review itself.98
The Supreme Court’s New Deal experience is illustrative. This
was the only time in the modern era that the Court seriously
attempted to rein in the constitutional power of Congress.99 In so
doing, the Court substantially increased the expected benefits of
litigation challenging federal legislation, with spectacular results.
In 1935 alone, “more than 100 district judges held acts of Congress
unconstitutional, issuing more than 1,600 injunctions against” a
vast array of New Deal legislation.100 Because the Supreme Court
feels compelled to review virtually every lower court decision invalidating federal legislation, it is impossible to imagine it keeping up
such an approach for long.101
To be sure, the Supreme Court currently decides significantly
fewer cases than it could handle.102 But it is not the ratio of the
Court’s current caseload (70-80 cases) to its maximum capacity (150200 cases) that matters.103 It is the ratio of the Court’s maximum
capacity to the potential volume of litigation the Court would invite
if it ignored its limited capacity in deciding cases. In the commerce
power context, that volume is hundreds or thousands of cases, far
more than the Court could handle without abandoning its deeply
rooted commitments to minimum professional standards and the
uniformity of federal law.104
To avoid overwhelming its capacity in this way, the Court has
consistently employed a combination of strong deference to Congress
and clear categorical rules that cleanly insulate most commerce
power legislation from constitutional challenge.105 Deference reduces
98. See Coan, supra note 18, at 439.
99. See Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP.
CT. REV. 103, 129-30.
100. Id. at 130.
101. See Coan, supra note 18, at 439.
102. Id. at 428 n.12.
103. See id. at 427-28; Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket:
The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1369 tbl. (2006).
104. See Coan, supra note 18, at 443-46.
105. See id. at 446.
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the expected value of bringing suit by increasing the odds that the
government will prevail. This, in turn, reduces the volume of litigation.106 Clear rules reduce uncertainty and thereby encourage greater voluntary compliance and settlement outside of court.107 Clear
rules also promote uniformity among lower court decisions, reducing
the need for Supreme Court review to achieve this end.108
This approach has enabled the Court to implement the enumeration principle without overwhelming its limited capacity, but the
cost to its institutional competence has been severe. Simply put, it
is exceedingly difficult to capture the complex dynamics of modern
American federalism in a clear categorical rule. A Court constrained
to employ such rules in deciding commerce power cases is laboring
under a substantial handicap.109
Any attempt to implement the enumeration principle therefore
forces the Court to choose between two bad options. It can either
settle for a crude categorical rule, which poorly serves the underlying purposes of American federalism, or risk overwhelming its own
limited capacity, which it has historically been unwilling to do.
Alternatively, the Court might simply abandon the field—not
because the political safeguards of federalism adequately protect
state interests, but because judicial implementation of the enumeration principle is likely to do more harm than good, given the Court’s
limited competence and capacity. None of these alternatives is
especially attractive, but no proponent of the enumeration principle
can avoid choosing among them.
V. A CONSTITUTION AT WAR WITH ITSELF?
The root of all these difficulties is a tension between internal
limits and effective national government. This tension has probably
always been there, as Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson’s
debate over the constitutionality of the first Bank of the United

106. See id. at 436; see also KOMESAR, supra note 94, at 147.
107. See Coan, supra note 18, at 436.
108. See id. at 440; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND
REFORM 178 (1996); Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change,
19 STAN. L. REV. 786, 819-20 (1967).
109. See Coan, supra note 18, at 447.

2010

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:1985

States attests.110 But it has grown exponentially more acute with the
industrial, transportation, and communication revolutions of the
last two centuries. Indeed, at the dawn of the twenty-first century,
the word “tension” no longer seems adequate. Against the background of today’s tightly integrated national economy, internal
limits and effective national government are not merely in tension;
they are in open conflict.111 One might even say that the passage of
time has placed the U.S. Constitution at war with itself.
The mechanism by which this conflict has arisen is straightforward. In 1789, both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause could be construed generously in order to ensure
their effective exercise without threatening the Constitution’s commitment to internal limits.112 By sometime in the middle of the
twentieth century, however, the volume of interstate commerce had
grown so vast—as had the spectrum of activities affecting such
commerce or affected by it—that the Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clauses threatened to engulf virtually all human activity.
Reasonable observers continued to endorse both commitments simultaneously, but with less and less conviction.113 Under these
110. See Hamilton’s Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States:
1791, YALE L. SCH.: AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bank-ah.asp
[https://perma.cc/JXS6-YMDP] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016); Jefferson’s Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank: 1791, YALE L. SCH.: AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.
edu/18th_century/bank-tj.asp [https://perma.cc/8CWF-76P4] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016); see
also Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill: The
Attorney General’s First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 DUKE L.J. 110, 112 (1994).
111. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v Lopez, 1995 SUP.
CT. REV. 125, 130 (“As commerce today seems plainly to reach practically every activity of
social life, it would seem to follow [from Gibbons and McCulloch] that Congress has the power
to reach, through regulation, practically every activity of social life.”).
112. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819) (“[I]t may with
great reason be contended, that a government, entrusted with such ample powers, on the due
execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must also
be entrusted with ample means for their execution.”), with id. at 405 (“This government is
acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers.”).
113. Compare Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937) (“Undoubtedly the scope of [the commerce] power ... may not be extended so as to ...
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create
a completely centralized government.”), with John Q. Barrett, Wickard v. Filburn (1942), at
5 (June 26, 2012), http://thejacksonlist.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/20120626-JacksonList-Wickard.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG7X-V682] (“If we were to be brutally frank, ... I suspect
what we would say is that in any case where Congress thinks there is an effect on interstate
commerce, the Court will accept that judgment.” (quoting Letter from Justice Robert H.
Jackson to Judge Sherman Minton (Dec. 21, 1942))). See generally Primus, Enumeration
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circumstances, it may well have become impossible—at least for the
Supreme Court, with its limited capacity and competence—to honor
both commitments simultaneously.
Contemporary interpreters have two essential options for handling such a conflict. On one hand, they might attempt to dissolve
it—to demonstrate that it is illusory, rather than real, or that the
Constitution itself anticipates and resolves it. On the other hand,
they might openly acknowledge the existence of a conflict and roll
up their sleeves for the difficult task of resolving it.
Despite their profound differences, Richard Primus, Kurt Lash,
and the Supreme Court majorities of Lopez, Morrison, and NFIB all
fall into the first of these camps. Primus dissolves the conflict in favor of effective national government, by treating internal limits as
a contingent, rather than a necessary, feature of the American Constitution.114 Kurt Lash and recent Supreme Court majorities
dissolve the conflict in favor of internal limits, by ignoring the need
to choose among a practically infinite universe of potential limits
and the need to balance Type I against Type II errors.115
One of these positions could be right, but it is worth considering
the possibility that the conflict is real and intractable. The Constitution might be genuinely, deeply committed both to internal limits
and to effective national government, and those commitments may,
in modern economic circumstances, be fundamentally irreconcilable.
Certainly, this is a conceptual possibility, and it should not be surprising to encounter such conflicts in a 225-year-old constitution.
A nonlegal analogy may be helpful. Suppose I promise, at T1, to
attend both my daughter’s cello recital and my son’s ballet performance. Then suppose, at T2, both events end up being scheduled for
the same evening. At T1, my two promises do not conflict, though
they have the potential to do so. At T2, circumstances have changed
to put them in direct conflict. I cannot be in two places at once.
Thus, it is physically impossible for me to honor both promises.

Matters, supra note 9 (explaining contemporary role of the enumeration principle as ceremonial rather than substantive).
114. See Primus, Limits, supra note 9, at 583.
115. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 615 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995); Lash, supra note 4, at
180-81.
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Faced with such a conflict, I have two essential choices. On one
hand, I might attempt to balance, or accommodate, the two commitments. For example, I might attend the first half of my daughter’s
recital and the second half of my son’s performance, or vice versa.
On the other hand, I might sacrifice one of my two commitments
based on a normative criterion outside the commitments themselves. For example, I might breach the promise to my daughter on
the ground that her brother needs my support more after getting cut
the previous week from the school glee club. The one thing I cannot
do is dissolve the conflict between my two promises. Nor can I resolve it by appeal to any sort of proviso, implicit in the original
promises, for adjudicating conflicts. By hypothesis, no such proviso
exists.
If changed circumstances have rendered it impossible to reconcile
the Constitution’s commitments to internal limits and effective
national government, contemporary constitutional interpreters are
in the same situation as our unfortunate overcommitted father.
They have two essential choices. On one hand, they might attempt
to balance, or accommodate, the two commitments. For example,
they might attempt to develop categorical rules that minimize the
sum of Type I and Type II errors across the run of cases, taking into
account the limits of judicial competence and capacity.116
On the other hand, contemporary interpreters might elect to sacrifice one commitment to the other on the basis of contemporary
needs and interests or some other normative criterion external to
the commitments themselves. For example, an interpreter might
give up on internal limits entirely based on the view that federalism
has ceased to serve any useful function in modern American society.117 Or, conversely, an interpreter might give up on effective
national government on the theory that decentralization better protects individual liberties. What contemporary interpreters cannot do
is dissolve the conflict or resolve it by appeal to a second-order
commitment establishing the relative priority of internal limits and
effective national government. By hypothesis, no such commitment
exists.
116. See supra Part IV.
117. See, e.g., MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND
TRAGIC COMPROMISE 5 (2008).
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Again, I do not contend that the Constitution’s commitments to
internal limits and effective national government are actually at
war with one another in this way. I contend only that constitutional
theorists should seriously consider this possibility, both in the context of the commerce power and across the spectrum of American
constitutional law. This brief Article is not the place for an extended
discussion of examples, so I will offer just one more speculative possibility.
New and old originalists sometimes argue over the best reading
of the Equal Protection Clause, with many new originalists contending that the Clause is best read as embodying an abstract
prohibition on unjust discrimination, whatever that objectively encompasses.118 Old originalists, by contrast, read the Clause more
narrowly—as a prohibition on those (and only those) specific practices the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment would
have intended or expected it to prohibit.119 Some critics of originalism also adopt this view of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
original meaning.120 On the former understanding, school segregation,
118. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 496 (2007) (“[T]he text of the Equal Protection Clause prohibits class legislation, caste legislation, ‘special’ or ‘partial’ legislation, and arbitrary and unreasonable
distinctions between persons or citizens.”); Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah Begley, Originalism and Same Sex Marriage 2 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 14-51, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2509443 [https://perma.cc/L3EN-XKSL] (interpreting “original public meaning” of the Equal
Protection Clause as “ban[ning] systems of caste and class-based discrimination”); see also
Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine,
114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 63-64 (2000) (“The text calls for equal protection and equal citizenship,
pure and simple.”).
119. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 457 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that the intention of the Framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment is clear and “as good as written into the text”); Richard S. Kay,
Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
703, 723 (2009) (endorsing an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment focused on “a far
narrower category of protected conduct ... intended by the actual people whose agreement
made the Constitution law”); cf. Amanda Terkel, Scalia: Women Don’t Have Constitutional
Protection Against Discrimination, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 6:20 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/03/scalia-woman-discrimination-constitution_n_803813.html
[https://perma.cc/BRP7-SSS5] (quoting Justice Scalia as saying: “Certainly the Constitution
does not require discrimination on the basis of sex. The only issue is whether it prohibits it.
It doesn’t. Nobody ever thought that that’s what it meant.”).
120. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884 (1995) (discussing historical evidence of the original intentions and expectations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters and
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sex discrimination, and discrimination based on sexual orientation
all violate the Constitution—or might plausibly be said to do so.121
On the latter understanding, none of these practices is constitutionally prohibited.
But what if the Framers and ratifiers were committed, in some
legally relevant sense, to both understandings? That is to say, what
if they affirmatively intended to permit the racial segregation of
public schools but simultaneously intended to prohibit all objectively
unjust government discrimination, or, in less anachronistic terms,
caste legislation? In this case, the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment is today—if it was not always—at war with
itself.
Under versions of originalism that treat only the semantic
meaning of the text as authoritative, this conflict might be legally
irrelevant.122 But under those that embrace original intent, understanding, and purpose, it would certainly not be. This conflict would
also be relevant to the much larger community of constitutional interpreters who view original intent, understanding, etc. as important but not dispositive. The options available to them for handling
this conflict would require significant care to unpack fully, but as
with the conflicts described above, they would basically boil down to
accommodation and sacrifice.
CONCLUSION
The enumeration principle has played a central role in recent
academic debates and Supreme Court decisions. Those debates and
decisions, however, have largely ignored the difficulties elaborated
in this Article. Personally, I suspect that these difficulties are insurratifiers).
121. See, e.g., Calabresi & Begley, supra note 118, at 1 (interpreting the original public
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to require marriage equality); Steven G. Calabresi
& Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11, 15 (2011)
(interpreting the original public meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit sex
discrimination).
122. But cf. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1118 (2003) (“To the extent that the secret
drafting history displays how the text of the Constitution was originally understood and used
by the hypothetical Ratifier, its use would not only be permissible, but indeed strongly
encouraged and perhaps required under an original public meaning approach.”).
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mountable, but I have not attempted to defend that conclusion here.
The important point is that no rigorous attempt to implement the
enumeration principle can avoid grappling with them. Given the
centrality of that principle to contemporary discussions of federalism, this is a vitally important task for lawyers, judges, and scholars
alike.
The difficulties of implementing the enumeration principle also
have a broader theoretical significance. They highlight the intriguing and little-discussed possibility that the passage of time might
place an entrenched constitution—and perhaps does place the U.S.
Constitution—at war with itself. Again, I have not attempted to
show that the Constitution’s commitments to internal limits and
effective national government actually conflict in this way, merely
that the possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand. Both in the
context of federalism and across the spectrum of American constitutional law, this possibility deserves more attention than it has received.

